Theological Truth from the Book of Habakkuk (in Kachin)

Myihtoi Habaku gaw shi a mungdan kata hta tara rap rai ai lam n nga ai hta sha n ga, tinang hta n gun grau ja ai, gum shem ai Babylon masha ni e matut zingri dip sha wa na lam (1:5-11) hpe chye ai shaloi, K.K hpe ning nga tsun jahtau nu ai:

N hkru n hkra ai hpe n yu hkra, myit magaw ai lam n mada hkra, san seng ai myi tu ai wa e, nang hpa majaw hkalem hkalau ai wa hpe a mada nga ai hte, tara n lang ai wa gaw, shi hta grau ding hpring ai wa hpe jahtum kau… (nga yang) nang hpa majaw atsin sha yu nga n ta?(1:13, 14b). Yehowa e, nang n madat ya ai, ngai gaten du hkra hpyi jahtau na rai ta? (1:1).

K.K Yehowa hpe ning ngu ga san ni hte pawt lai wa sai myihtoi Habaku hpang jahtum tsun ai kraw dung nsen gaw:

“Shing rai, lakum hpun gaw pu n pu, Tsabyi ru gaw asi n si, Tsanlun hpun gaw kaman sha tu, Yi hkauna mung nai mam n pru; Sagu lawng hta sagu hpung kata. Dumsu lawng hta dumsu n pra, ti mung, Ngai gaw Yehowa hta kabu gara nga na nngai; Ngai hpe hkye hkrang la ai Karai Kasang hta sharawng awng nga na nngai.” (3:17).

Hpa majaw Habaku ning ngu ai ga hpe lu tsun ai rai ta? Habaku gaw lani mi K.K Yehowa a tara rap ra ai lam shi a mungdan hte shi a myu masha ni lapran dik tup wa na re hpe tup hkrak kam sham ai majaw re. Tinang a n re ai sut gan mahkawng da nna, tinang a ntsa e ru hka shalaw (2:6) nga ai, “tinang tsip hpe matsaw ntsang de tsip da nna, ru tsang ai lata na lawt lu hkra, tinang a nta matu n tara ai amyat sha” (2:9) nga ai hte “asai jahkaw ai hte, kahtawng de ai wa, myit magaw ai hte, mare (mungdan) shangang” (2:12) nga ai Babylon hkawm hkam wa hte shi a asuya up hkang masa ni hpe K.K lani mi teng sha dingnye jaw je yang na lam Habaku gaw K.K kaw nna mungga na la nu ai. Dai majaw Yehowa K.K Habaku hpe shadum ai gaw: ding hpring ai wa chyawm gaw, shi a kam sham ai hte hkrung nga lu na ra ai (2:4) nga ai re. Ndai tengman ai mungga hpe na la lu ai hte dai hpe kam sham nga ai majaw Habaku gaw lahta na hte maren K.K hpe shakawn lu nga ai re.

Ndai mungga gaw dai ni anhte yawng hpe matut shadum let n gun jaw nga ai hpe galoi mung myit dum n gun la let kam sham myit hte asak hkrung nga ga law. 

Book Review:

Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, Andrew Sach, Pierced For Our Transgressions: Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2007).

The book is divided into two major parts. In first part, the authors set out their case for this book and then in the second part, they critically and analytically respond to the critics of Penal Substitution. Why do they need to write this book in defense of Penal substitution? They are aware that Christian fundamental doctrines have been constantly attacked by others. But in this case, it is strange and disturbing because “some of the more recent critics of penal substitution regard themselves evangelicals, and claim to be committed to the authority of Scripture”(p.25). And they also recognize that this criticism is not just confined to academic books and journals, it has become popular in Christian books and magazines, which creates confusion and alarm among Christians. The most pressing reason for them to write this book is “that the misconceived criticisms of penal substitution show no sign of abating, and the resulting confusion within the Christian community seems to be increasing rather than decreasing” (31).

Therefore, before they refute against the claims of the critics, they first lay the biblical foundations of penal substitution; theological framework, the pastoral importance and historical pedigree of penal substitution. In so doing, the authors convincingly bring together in this particular book “a detailed examination of the key biblical passages, a consideration of the important theological and doctrinal issues, and a comprehensive survey of the teaching of the Christian church through the ages” (30). They comprehensively argue for that “God gave himself in the person of his Son to suffer instead of us the death, punished and curse due to fallen humanity as the penalty for sin” (21). In arguing this concept, the authors exegete many biblical texts and the most fascinating thing is the way they laid out Old Testament passages, which we would normally think in other way, in support for penal substitution. For example, they present two distinct acts of salvation from Exodus 11-12; first, by means of the judgment of God there is a salvation from the tyranny of the Egyptians. Second, by means of the Passover sacrifice there is a salvation from the judgment of God. The tenth plague is distinct from the other nine: it is conditional in the sense the Israelites are not automatically spared from death. The “blood” of a lamb must be shed. So the lamb becomes a substitute for the firstborn son, dying in his place. Here the Israelites were to be delivered not from Pharaoh, but from the judgment of the Lord. This is what they call “unambiguous affirmation of penal substitution” (36).

And they persuasively incorporate all the biblical foundations on penal substitution into the big picture of theological framework such as doctrine of God: Trinity; creation, sin and redemption. For example, they argue that God is not composed of different ‘parts’ of attributes “as though he could be dismantled somehow into separate component. We cannot speak of God’s love as though it were a ‘part’ of God, separate from his holiness…(so) penal substitution preserves the truth that justice is firmly rooted in the character of God,” (138) in his Holiness.

The historical survey that shows how this doctrine has been present and preserved from Justin Martyr (c. 100-165) to the recent the Evangelical Alliance’s reaffirmation of this doctrine in 2006 clearly refutes against critics’ ‘late-development’ (specifically after reformation) theory of penal substitution. So they claim that “it is time to lay it to rest for good” (164).

            In part two, the authors engage with “the work of recent critics” (206) especially Stuart Murray Williams, Joel B. Green and Baker’s Recovering the Scandal of the Cross, and the writings of Alan Mann and Steve Chalke, and forcefully yet thoughtfully answer all the critics’ claims. Critics have variety of claims that penal substitution is not taught in the Bible or it is not significant and some thought that this doctrine unfortunately becomes a source of division between believers (ch.7). After careful presentation of how the Bible clearly teaches about penal substitution, they conclude that it lies at the heart of the gospel. And there are “some issues on which division is both necessary and inevitable…(yet) it is possible (and desirable) for Christians to retain unity in the gospel if they differ on” issues such as church leadership or even speaking in tongues! Thus they boldly claim “if those who impugn penal substitution refuse to reconsider their position, there comes a time when we have no alternative but to part company” (217). This statement shows their commitment to the authority and testimony of the Bible. 

            In addition, they answer thoughtfully the Critics’ claims that this doctrine is the product of our culture (ch.8); it encourages the myth of redemptive violence, and as a result it turns out to be “cosmic child abuse!” (ch.9); it undermines God’s true forgiveness and thus it implies universal salvation (ch.10); it is contrary to the character of God (ch.11) and it has negative implications for the Christian practical life.

            I agree with the authors that if we profess to be evangelicals we need to think seriously on whose work we heavily rely on when we criticize the penal substitution. It is clear that Chalke and Alan Mann rely heavily on the work of Walter Wink, who also criticizes penal substitution as an instance of ‘the myth of redemptive violence.’ Wink again in turn depends on the work of Rene Girard, whose “work is thoroughly unbiblical at key points” (236). Again since Wink claims surprisingly that the apostle Paul was “unable” to understand correctly the sacrificial nature of Jesus’ death and that “Christianity has suffered from this confusion ever since,” (237-8) it indirectly suggests that he does not believe in verbal inspiration of the Bible. Thus, relying heavily on such a so-called “theologian” and criticize the biblical truth on penal substation, the Critics are self-contradicting to what they have professed in regard to their faith.

            On the other hand, in the process of refuting against Critics’ claim of universalism, the authors vigorously and thoroughly defend the doctrine of particular redemption (pp.268-278), which might be disturbing to some. They are also aware this fact that the section “has become a rather lengthy defense of particular redemption in a book supposed to be about penal substitution!” (278). However, they defend themselves again that “in theology every piece of the jigsaw is ultimately connected to everything else” in order to avoid like the Critics who have put these pieces in the wrong place.

            And it is also thrilling to see the authors’ label as “the vague objection” on the criticism deployed by some with a reputation for theological expertise. According to them, the objection is rather “a naked exercise of power” (326). To the objections of people such as Steve Chalke and Alan Mann, they label as “the emotional objection” deployed in “forceful langue in the absence of a reasoned argument, rather than as a climax to it” (326). In appendix of the book, the authors conclude the book with a warning about ill-thought illustrations in regard to penal substitution, such as illustrations which deny active and consenting involvement of the Father and the Son; which portrays conflict between God’s law and God’s will, and so on.

            All things considered, this book is one of the most comprehensive treatments available of the doctrine of penal substitution with clear and understandable writing style for all. The authors have comprehensively argued that penal substitution is clearly taught in Scripture; it is a central Christian doctrine throughout history; and they have also showed serious pastoral consequences if we neglect this doctrine. And they have also answered comprehensively to the objections raised against it. As a matter of fact, we need to refute against those objections because we do not enjoy encountering with “other gospels,” and finally one day if those who criticize this biblical doctrine “would turn from them and embrace the glorious truth that our Lord Jesus Christ ‘bore our sins in his body on the cross, so that we might die to sins and live for righteousness’ (1 Pet. 2:24)” (328), then we would surely be rejoice more.   

The Components of Human Being

Regarding the components of human being, some hold “substance dualism” or holistic dualism. This view sees a person as a bipartitle unity of an immaterial, undying soul/spirit and a body/dying material. On the other hand, some are of the view that human is composed of three essential elements, so it is called trichotomism. Based on 1 Thessalonians 5:23, they hold that human being is consisting three discrete parts- (1) a physical body (passions); (2) a rational soul (reason, emotion, will), and (3) an immortal spirit that can relate to God. So a parson consists of two immaterial substances and one material substance.

Yet one question must be asked: do the terms such as soul, spirit, and heart yield separate meaning that can dichotomize one from another? Or do they speak the meaning referring to the same reality, but used interchangeably? Careful word study of the usage in the bible gives warrant to the latter question. Why? The biblical words such as “soul” “spirit” “heart” “body” and “flesh” are used interchangeably, referring to the same reality.

O God, you are my God; earnestly I seek you; my soul thirsts for you; my flesh faints for you, as in a dry and weary land where there is no water (Ps. 63:1). Here Psalmist use “soul” and “flesh” in poetic parallelism refer to the same reality.

Therefore I will not restrain my mouth; I will speak in the anguish of my spirit, I will complain in the bitterness of my soul (Job 7:11, cf. Isa.26:9) here the words are also used in parallelism referring to the same reality.

When we compare John 12:27 with 13:21, and Hebrew 12:23 with Revelation 6:9, the terms “soul” and “spirit” are used interchangeably. And the followings are the texts in which the term soul, spirit and heart are used as quasi-synonyms:

For the word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and of spirit, of joints and of marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of the heart (Heb. 4:12).

You shall love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might (Deut. 6:5).

In addition, the terms “heart” and “flesh” are also used as quasi-synonyms: My flesh and my heart may fail, but God is the strength of my heart and my portion forever (Ps. 73:26). 

All things considered, the biblical usage nevertheless allows us to identify soul and spirit with the person’s inner life, and body with the outward, material vessel. Soul and spirit appears to be two aspects of human’s inner nature. Here are biblical-theological conclusions concerning the constitution of the human being.

1.      Functional Aspect: the Bible see human being functionally a unified whole. So the terms such as spirit, soul, heart and body are used to denote the entire person. The “soul” can be seen the self who thinks, wills and feels; and “spirit” that communicates God, thus, executes moral judgments. And the word “body” usually means the material instrument through which soul/spirit functions.

2.      Relational Aspect: we cannot dichotomize the components of human beings. Soul, spirit, heart and body are the best seen as the entire person engaging and interacting with one another as well as other human beings.

3.      Ethical Aspect: it is wrong to assume that our body is evil substance whereas the soul alone is to be considered good. The body is not a prison for the soul. Both human body and soul are substantially good.

4.      Essential Aspect: essentially human being is a complex unity. It is unity in complexity that includes material body and inner immaterial soul/spirit or heart. We can assume this view as holistic dualism. It is in fact clear that we can distinguish (but not polarize or dichotomize) material and immaterial components of human being. Daniel 7:15 reads, “I Daniel was grieved in my spirit in the midst of my body” [KJV]. And Matthew 10: 20 clearly distinguish body and soul: “Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the one who can destroy both soul and body in hell.” “Thus, soul/spirit and body are substances, each with distinguishing qualities.”

The Bible clearly teaches that our material body will decay, but immaterial soul/spirit is being renewed by the indwelling Spirit. In this present time, Christ’s redemption touches inner transformation. At His second coming, the dead will be raised and there will be total transformation of material body (Rom. 8:10, 23 and 2 Cor. 4:16). Moreover, the doctrine of intermediate state clearly supports the concept of dualistic dualism (Matt. 17:3; Lk. 16:19-31, 2 Cor. 5:1-9, Ph. 1:22-24; 2Peter 1:13-15; Rev. 6:9-11 and 20:4). “Today you will be with me in paradise” (Luke 23:43). Jesus clearly indicates intermediate state for the soul/spirit in heaven. And Paul also asserts that in death believers’ immaterial soul/spirit will depart from the body to be with Christ (2 Cor. 5:1-8).

All things considered, it is clear that we cannot and should not dichotomize body from the soul/spirit vise visa. There is unity in human being in which the immaterial soul/spirit resides in the body and acts through as its instrument. The body acts out what soul/spirit wills, desires and directs. There is mutually conditioned reality in our human being. The soul/spirit acts on the body and the body acts on the soul/spirit. However, we will not fathom how soul/spirit and body interact, just as we cannot comprehend how God, who is Spirit, interact with material universe; yet we are experiencing in our daily life. Thus, it is also complex. Finally I want to quote what Lewis and Demarest have to say about components of our body:

The whole person is a complex unity composed of two distinct entities, soul and body, intimately interacting with one another. Neither of them is the whole person, yet either part can stand figuratively for the whole person. While they are alive the two natures (physical and spiritual) are neither divided nor confused. A whole person has attributes of spirit and attributes of body. Although body and spirit are separate entities ontologically, in this life they are intricately united. For metaphysical purposes… a human being is composed of an interacting dichotomy of spirit and body.